Post-Election Crisis in Kenya: A Regional Perspective
Jeremy Ng’ang’a

The unprecedented post-election violence that was witnessed in Kenya at the beginning of the year had its impact felt beyond the country’s geographical borders, especially in the rest of the Eastern and Central African region. Stemming from a flawed electoral process, a flare-up of a seemingly built-up ethnic tension saw the loss on hundreds of lives, displacement of hundreds of thousands of people and destruction of property worth millions of shillings (even dollars).  Economic supply lines were disrupted, which serve not just Uganda and northern Tanzania, but also Rwanda, Burundi, Eastern DRC and Southern Sudan. Due to the political nature of the crisis, diplomatic realignments also re-emerged in the otherwise fragile political bloc.
Apparently, not much has been written regarding this catastrophic phenomenon apart from what the newspapers had carried since its onset. Yet for history to be written concerning the crisis, serious academic discourse needs to take place. Such discourse would involve a multidisciplinary approach to research and assessment of the causes and impact of the crisis, a process that would take years to realise.
It is out of the desire to initiate debate on the crisis that the African Research and Resource Forum (ARRF) organised a one-day seminar on the “Regional Dimensions of the Post-election Crisis in Kenya” at the Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi. The seminar, which took place on 20 March 2008, brought together scholars, political observers and social commentators from the region. Among the issues discussed were: the forecasts of Kenya’s socio-political scenario, the post-elections crisis and the lessons that the region could learn from the crisis.

The socio-political scenario

In his opening remarks, ARRF Chairman, Prof. Michael Chege, observed that although there was marked tension before and during the elections, Kenyans were not psychologically prepared for the development that ensued; the violent scenes were too ghastly to contemplate with the media flashing them across the world. Seemingly, the flare-up was a culmination of an entrenched tension that had built up over the years resulting from socio-political grievances, some of which had their genesis in the colonial era. For example, the colonial structure of land tenure persists forty-four years after attaining political independence. It is not surprising that the unequal distribution of land resources is still widely blamed as the main cause of inequality in the country.
Another feature has been the proliferation of ethnic politics where ethnicity has been used for political mobilisation. Although this feature was clearly manifested at independence, it has especially been visible since the restoration of multiparty politics in 1991 and the subsequent elections of 1992, 1997, 2002 and now 2007. After the December 2007 elections, the country was sharply polarised along ethnic lines to the extent that none of the two leading parties ODM and PNU could form a truly legitimate government. Thus, the crisis was largely caused by the failure of the political class to understand the management of ethnic affairs.
While presenting the possible futures that Kenya could face, Wallace Kantai and Katindi Sivi of the Institute for Economic Affairs observed that the post-election crisis would have pushed the country to total breakdown. The duo’s presentation was based on a document titled Kenya at the Crossroads: Scenarios for Our Future. This document was published by the Institute jointly with the Society for International Development and was based on findings from diverse groups and stakeholders on the possible post-Moi scenarios over a period of ten to fifteen years. The main aim of formulating these scenarios was to stimulate debate on how to shape the life of the country in the next decade.
The findings resulted in four main scenarios, namely El Niño Road, Maendeleo Road, Katiba Road and Flying Geese Road. The El Niño Road featured the absence of political and economic reform, which would lead to total breakdown of the country. Politicians would fan the flames of ethnicity and ethnic militias would be formed.  The Maendeleo Road consisted of economic recovery, while neglecting political reform. Katiba Road was depicted almost as the vice versa of Maendeleo Road, as it featured intensive political reforms without a parallel effort in economic recovery. Finally, there was the Flying Geese Road where both political and economic reform featured prominently and was characterised by youthful leadership mainly emanating from the grassroots. One main challenge was to identify which road Kenya was taking as the country went into the elections.
To a large extent, the post-election crisis exposed the scenario that the country was fast running into. Although remarkable economic reforms had been realised over the previous four years, the failure to effect political reforms had divided the country sharply. The referendum held in November 2005 to adopt a government-sponsored draft constitution had left the President, his cabinet and his region isolated. Unemployment, especially among the youth (who make up to 60% of the population), was rampant. This, coupled with unequal distribution of resources among regions, was now a major grievance, though highly politicised.
It is with this political isolation and intense emotions that the country went to the polls in December 2007. Even as the country voted, tension was clearly visible, and the world was keenly watching, including the region.

The post-elections crisis

According to Professor Mwesiga Baregu of the Department of Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam and the key presenter at the seminar, the crisis in Kenya was purely one of political legitimacy. The situation resulted from the fact that the December 2007 elections had been held against a background of a contested constitutional framework. Even after nearly eighteen years of agitation, the introduction of a new constitution had failed.
As soon as the government side lost in the constitutional referendum, it was clear that it was now losing political legitimacy, which would not be restored through elections alone. The attempt on the part of the government to manipulate the electoral commission by appointing more pliable members in place of the independent ones just before the election and the choice of the election date close to the expiry of the president’s mandate created great suspicion.
Following the announcement of presidential election results and the subsequent hasty swearing in of the President, demonstrations were held in Nairobi, Rift Valley, Nyanza, Coast and Western Provinces. In some instances, violence erupted, which was to claim lives and see property destroyed. At one point, the violence threatened to engulf the entire country.  
Meanwhile, the government, featuring a coalition of the Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement – Kenya (ODM-K) was locked in a confrontation with the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). The latter held that the solution to the crisis lay not on legal or constitutional remedies, but on political settlement. This view was shared with the mediators who included the United Nations, the African Union and development partners led by the United States, Britain and the European Union (EU). This is the route that the Koffi Annan team took when the mediation process kicked off in January 2008.

The impact of the crisis on the region

As noted earlier, the crisis had a profound impact on the region. Other than disrupting communication, travel, trade and general interaction, it threatened to paralyse the East African Community and other regional institutions. Indeed, according to Hon Majur Machar of the Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund (SSRDF) and a participant at the seminar, Southern Sudan was greatly affected because, being landlocked (like Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi), it is dependent on Kenya for the importation of goods through the port of Mombasa. The crisis was not just a Kenyan one, but it was a regional problem.
The immediate reaction to the crisis exposed the diverse perceptions in the region concerning Kenya. There were the Afro-pessimists who held the view that nothing in Africa works, hence Kenya was just an illusion and that the crisis was an imminent failure of state. Then there were those who believed in Kenya and viewed the crisis as accidental and a diversion from the norm; they were hopeful that the country would revert to its former self. Finally, there were sceptics about the political system in Kenya and held that the country was undergoing a test of political legitimacy. The crisis was thus a blessing in disguise as it would provide an opportunity to undertake reforms.
There were also those sceptics in the region who saw Kenya’s crisis as an opportunity to grow their businesses, especially in the tourism sector. Indeed some operators in the industry visualised how they would divert tourists from Kenyan destinations by vilifying the situation in Kenya subsequently modifying their advertisements and other promotional efforts.
In diplomatic circles, regional leaders were especially caught in between taking sides and not taking sides. While Uganda and Rwanda spoke publicly about the crisis, Tanzania opted to refrain from issuing any comment perhaps due to the delicate position that the country was in at the time – involvement of former president Benjamin Mkapa in the Annan team, the Zanzibar question, the assumption to the AU chair and the impeding visit of the US President, George Bush. Rwandan President, Paul Kagame, went public; at the height of violence, he even called for intervention by the military.
By and large, the Kenyan crisis was felt all over the region. The mediation efforts that were spearheaded by the former US Secretary-General, Koffi Annan, working with a group of eminent persons from Africa, finally came to fruition on 28 February 2008 when an accord was signed between the government and the Orange Democratic Movement. This accord, following its ratification by the National Assembly, saw the formation of a Grand Coalition government on 13 April 2007.

Lessons learnt from the crisis

Other countries in the region, and indeed the rest of Africa, learnt a lot from this unfortunate episode in Kenya’s history. As noted earlier, the main cause of the crisis was the legitimacy deficit arising from the failure to deliver a new constitutional order that would legitimise the relationship between the government and the governed. This is not a problem that is unique to Kenya, but is characteristic of many African countries which still cling to the independence constitutions. The crisis was a reminder that they too may face the legitimacy test.
Another useful lesson is the issue of institutional capacity. The Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), despite having the constitutional mandate to supervise elections, went on and goofed resulting in a flawed election. The confusion surrounding the presidential results was mainly responsible for the ensuing mayhem. Such institutions with enormous responsibilities ought to be autonomous and transparent in carrying out their mandate.
African countries were also invited to rethink their electoral systems. Kenya’s system, which essentially involves the first-past-the-post principle, appeared deficient in the face of the outcome of the elections. As the winners were evenly matched, the winner-takes-it-all approach proved unrepresentative. It is therefore necessary for the countries to examine their systems in order to avert related crises.
The issue of decentralisation of power also needs examination. This antethesis, commonly referred to as ‘majimbo’, was at the centre of contention during the campaigns with its proponents arguing that it was the best way to distribute national resources. They also maintain that there is dissatisfaction with the over-centralisation of power in the national institutions. It is believed that substantial democracy may be achieved more at the local than at the national level.
More significantly, the Kenyan crisis was symptomatic; it demonstrated that, with the historical ties in the region, what happened to Kenya could happen to any country in East Africa. If the East African countries can learn from the crisis, then they could offer leadership to the rest of Africa.

Conclusion

Just as the creation of Kenya about a century ago linked the country to the rest of the Eastern African region, any political crisis that disturbs this link is bound to be felt in the entire region. The country’s strategic importance puts it in the limelight whenever a minor crisis occurs. Based on the lessons that were learned from this crisis, there is need for the East African countries to work together to address the issues that led to the crisis.   
This article is based on the presentations that were made during the Seminar on the Regional Dimension of the Post-election Crisis in Kenya, 20 March 2008, at the Norfolk Hotel, Nairobi.  Jeremy Ng’ang’a is a consulting editor of New Path.